

FOREIGN POLICY FORUM

Should U.S. Recognize Peiping?

(Public opinion in the United States, as well as the rest of the world, has become focused on Communist China as a result of two far-reaching developments. The first has been the secret off-thrusts and secret thrusts between mainland China, controlled by the Communist government of Premier Mao Tse-tung, and the Island of Formosa, controlled by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The second has been the intervention of the United Nations, represented by its secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjold, in the case of the 11 American fliers condemned as spies by the Peiping government.)

Will these developments lead to war in the Far East? Or will they result in an easing of tensions in that strategic area? What should be the next steps in United States policy toward Peiping and Formosa? In this issue of the BULLETIN one view is presented by Nicholas Roosevelt, former Minister to Hungary and distinguished writer on world affairs. In the issue of February 15 another view will be expressed by Senator William H. Knowland, Republican of California, leader of the Republican party in the Senate. —Editor)

To form an enlightened opinion about the question, "Should the United States recognize the Peiping government?" it is necessary to consider (1) whether such recognition would imply an endorsement of the political system and ideals of that government, (2) whether it would involve turning over Formosa to Red China, and (3) in the event that recognition were to be decided upon as desirable, whether such recognition should be

extended forthwith and unconditionally or only when and if the government of Red China agrees to recognize the rights and principles commonly accepted by civilized nations in diplomatic intercourse.

Recognition Issue

Let us consider these three points briefly.

(1) The government of the United States recognized the government of the U.S.S.R. in November 1933. By no stretch of the imagination could this routine diplomatic act be twisted into approval of communism or of Soviet imperialism. Similarly, recognition of Red China in no way would imply approval of the methods or the political ideals of the Peiping government. Rather it would be merely a diplomatic acceptance of the reality that the Peiping government is the *de facto* government of present-day China. It is not amiss to note here that many students of Far Eastern affairs believe that if the United States had recognized this government six or eight years ago our relations with China might have been better than they have been under the policy of nonrecognition.

One of the diplomatic arguments against recognition of the Peiping government is that the United States has for years officially dealt with the government headed by Chiang Kai-shek as the *de jure* government of China and that, consequently, to recognize Peiping would necessitate withdrawing recognition from the "Nationalist" government. This is true. But it should be borne in mind that at no time did the Chinese "Na-

tionalists" exercise sovereignty over more than a part of the mainland of China and that for the last five years they have not controlled a single square mile of the Chinese mainland. Thus in actual fact the continuing recognition of the so-called "Nationalist" government is nothing more than diplomatic prolongation of a political myth. One might just as well recognize one of the Russian grand dukes as head of the government of Russia as to make believe that Chiang is head of the government of China.

No Need to Relinquish Formosa

(2) Formosa never formed an essential part of the Chinese Empire and was never under the control of the republic. Its transfer to Red China would be so clearly against the interests of the free world that it is inadmissible. The Chinese Communists want it for two reasons: (a) to have a military outpost through which the U.S.S.R. and Red China could embarrass the United States and (b) to enable the Chinese Communists to liquidate or disperse and despoil those Chinese who fled to that island in order to escape the persecutions of the Red China government. Both these arguments work strongly in favor of preventing Formosa from falling into the hands of the Reds.

The fact that Formosa must be denied to the Reds does not justify using the island as the main base of military operations against the Chinese mainland. Military experts are agreed that an invasion attempted by Chiang's troops would be doomed to

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failure unless backed by the full might of the American Navy, Army and Air Force. The United States could not give such backing without, in fact, going to war with Communist China. Nothing would better suit the Soviet imperialists than to see the United States thus embroiled. Not only would such a war disastrously weaken the United States, but it would make it impossible for us to help Europe's certain new Russian plans of aggrandizement on that continent. Moreover, it would assist Soviet propaganda throughout Asia that the United States is determined to impose its will on the Asian peoples by war. Greater folly than all out war by the United States against Red China is hard to imagine.

Incidentally, one of the arguments in favor of placing Formosa under

a trusteeship of the United Nations or an international body is that this would keep it out of the hands of the Chinese Communists and at the same time deprive the Peking government of the propaganda argument that Formosa is a "threat" to mainland China.

(3) It is axiomatic that should the government of the United States decide to extend recognition to the Peking government, it would not do so until such time as Soviet policy, the expedient of that regime, would be condemned by the people of the country by war. Greater folly than all out war by the United States against Red China is hard to imagine.

Even should these conditions prove impossible to obtain, and recognition thus far reluctantly postponed

no valid reason exists for continuing to act on the assumption that support of Chiang and the Chinese Nationalists is an indispensable prerequisite to continuing or ending the control of the mainland by the Chinese Communists. Chiang is the *de facto* head of the government in Formosa, thanks to the overwhelming and largely genuine generosity of the American government. Who, not recognizing him as able and popular in the Chinese mainland, than the Nationalist government is the government of China? The main objective is to keep Formosa out of the hands of the Red imperialists, and never to sacrifice the position and interests of the peoples of China and the rest of Asia to the machinations of the Red Chinese.

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FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

Untapped Resources of the U.S.

In the course of the so-called Cabinet meeting of October 21, at which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reported on the success of negotiations for a Western European Union, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey asked how much the new arrangement would cost the United States. Mr. Dulles cheerfully replied that it would "not cost us another pinkie toe," and this seemed to reassess the budget makers.

The Cabinet TV program, however, could have been made highly educational for the voters who are also taxpayers if it had been taken into account that the cost of world leadership cannot be measured, and when Britain played this role, never was measured. By money alone, in fact, the less emphasis we place on the material contribution we intend to make to the non-Communist world, the more we shall be able to

improve our chances of maintaining and conserving our most important overseas resources. This is becoming increasingly important as our country begins to be threatened. The more important we become, the more events, favorable or otherwise, can threaten our freedom and independence.

A Share-the-Culture Program

Since we started giving aid to foreign countries in 1947 with the Marshall plan, followed by NATO, Point Four and other programs, there has been a good deal of talk, but most of it future, about the best way to spread philosophy or belief. Those who occupied in Southeast Asia or in anyone in the United States that perhaps the majority of our people

are not fully informed, are not fully aware of the good. Not only is our cultural influence important, but so is our military influence. We have a great many other resources, including our natural resources, which are available in the United States. For example, there are many opportunities available to us to share something unique and special with the people of the rest of the world, and the United States can do this through its educational programs, and we must let our foreign governments know that we are interested in sharing our culture with other peoples.

Such as, India, Russia, and China, but also such others as the Soviet Union, Mexico, and South America. We have a great many people in the United States who are interested in different cultures. For example, the Chinese, the Indians, the Vietnamese, the Cambodians, the Laotians, the Thais, the Burmese, the Filipinos, and the Indonesians. These people are interested in our culture. In India, for example, the government of India, with education, has organized a Chinese Cultural Center, by presenting a well selected